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THE RIGHT TO REHABILITATION FOR PRISONERS-
JUDICIAL REFORM OF THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS
PETER DWYER* AND MICHAEL BOTEIN**
If in a past generation crime became rampant west of
the Pecos, good citizens opined that the way to curb it
was to hire more law-enforcement officers to bring in
more outlaws, dead or alive. I am afraid our thinking
today is no more sophisticated than the frontier thinking
of a century ago....
This frantic, panicky pouring of more resources into
police agencies-the maw of the criminal-justice system
-this preoccupation with ingestion rather than digestion,
is reminiscent of the famed pelican whose beak holds
more than his belly can. It is as irresponsible, thought-
less and mischievous as the overfeeding of babies to stop
them from crying. t
Bernard Botein, 1900-1974.
I. INTRODUCTION
At the present time, this country's correctional process func-
tions somewhat like an inefficient sewage treatment plant. It con-
tinually takes new human beings whom society has discarded and,
after a recycling process, merely returns them in the same condi-
tion or worse. For so long as the correctional process fails to correct,
it can neither alter its product nor improve the social environment.
Just as society needs the correctional process to protect it-
self against individuals whom it deems dangerous, prisoners need
rehabilitation in order to reclaim their rightful roles in society.
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University, 1966; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1969; LL.M., George Washington
National Law Center, 1973.
** Associate Professor of Law-Rutgers University School of Law. B.A., Wesleyan
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t B. BOTEIN, OUR CITIES BURN WHILE WE PLAY COPS AND ROBBERS 10-11 (1972).
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But prisons simply do not do the job. Since the conventional
political processes have produced no significant reform, the courts
must intervene and recognize a right to rehabilitation for prisoners.
Courts have toyed with a grand "right to rehabilitation," but
have implemented only a narrow right to psychiatric treatment.1
Although psychiatric treatment is definitely part of rehabilitation,
rehabilitation is broader than mental health. Indeed, the most
difficult part of recognizing the right to rehabilitation is defining
it. Every human being is unique and needs a different form of
help. Generally, rehabilitation is any action which allows a pris-
oner to rejoin society successfully, without impinging on his civil
rights or society's civilized senses.
To a very real extent, courts must invent the "definition" of
rehabilitation as they go along by tailoring the remedy to each
prison and prisoner. The courts have provided this type of protec-
tion to other basic rights for years and, more recently, to some
prisoners' rights.2 The creation of the right to rehabilitation, there-
fore, depends largely upon judicial intervention in the correctional
process.
II. REHABILITATION-THE RIGHT
Currently, the courts do not recognize the right to rehabili-
tation. Their attitude springs from practical, rather than legal
considerations. Despite its recent activism, the judiciary will not
base rights on social scientists' latest brain-storms. The courts will
not recognize the right to rehabilitation until it has been validated
by thorough observation and legitimized by general acceptance.
This recognition in turn depends upon a more informed public
attitude toward those who somehow deviate from societal norms.
But the courts will find ample doctrinal basis for the right
to rehabilitation when they decide to recognize it. First, courts
have increasingly required psychiatric treatment for those who
are civilly confined rather than criminally imprisoned. Second,
an emerging line of cases supports an equal protection right to
rehabilitative treatment for prisoners. Finally, the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause 3 has recently been used to provide an im-
posing repository of rights for prisoners.
1. See pp. 275-81 infra.
2. See, e.g., pp. 299-300 infra.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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A. Analogy to Non-prisoners in the "Treatment" Group
The courts have held that a number of non-prisoner groups
have a right to treatment. As extreme social deviants, members
of these groups resemble criminals in terms of their public image
and the government's attitude toward them. Combined with
general acceptance of the "treatment" philosophy for them, their
similarity to prisoners should encourage courts to apply the same
rationale to prisoners. These non-prisoner "treatment" cases
highlight several legal bases for the right to rehabilitation.
In Rouse v. Cameron,4 the District of Columbia Circuit re-
quired treatment for a criminal defendant who had been civilly
committed after having been found not guilty because of insanity.
While recognizing that imprisonment without treatment raised
serious due process questions,5 the court placed primary reliance
on a District of Columbia statute entitling mental patients to psy-
chiatric care and treatment. 6
Rouse might have used a procedural due process argument
because mental patients stand to lose their freedom, but do not
receive the same due process safeguards as criminals. Accordingly,
they should get some other advantage as compensation; other-
wise, their confinement would be nothing more than imprison-
ment without procedural due process. Treatment is the quid pro
quo which justifies mental patients' limited due process rights.
Rouse also raised an equal protection issue which could stand
on its own or supplement the procedural due process argument. 7
While both mental patients and criminals are confined involun-
tarily, criminals receive elaborate procedural safeguards. Parens
patriae treatment for patients arguably justifies the disparity. Thus,
unless treatment is provided, there is no legitimate equal protec-
4. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
5. The court also referred to a possible issue of eighth amendment cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 453.
6. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 24-301(d) (1973) states:
If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense, or
tried in the juvenile court of the District of Columbia for an offense, is
acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of its com-
mission, the court shall order such person to be confined in a hospital for
the mentally ill.
The court said that continued failure to provide care and treatment was not justi-
fied by insufficient staff or facilities. 373 F.2d at 457. Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d
519 (D.C. Cir. 1967) later applied a similar District of Columbia statute, D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-562 (1973), to mental patients who were not criminal defendants.
7. 373 F.2d at 453.
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tion basis for giving mental patients more limited procedural
rights than criminals.
Other courts have applied precisely these arguments in
slightly different forms. Both a federal and a state court have
found a right to treatment based on due process and equal pro-
tection.8 And Wyatt v. Stickney 9 cited Rouse to establish a due
process right to treatment. 10 The court used the procedural due
process reasoning of Rouse and dealt with equal protection and
substantive due process as well. It held that civil commitment
has no rational relation to legitimate legislative purposes unless
treatment is provided, since the state's only interest in civil com-
mitment is furtherance of its parens patriae power."
The courts have also upheld statutes allowing indefinite com-
mitment of sexual psychopaths because the goal of the statutes
was found to be treatment rather than punishment.' 2 A New York
court recognized the right to treatment of an indefinitely com-
mitted sex offender, 13 and a Michigan court found the same right
under a sexual psychopath statute, rejecting outright the state's
claim that confinement was sufficient treatment. 14
Courts have recognized treatment rights for juveniles as well.
The District of Columbia Circuit noted that a child in a receiving
home is entitled to adequate psychiatric care.' 5 Somewhat later,
the same court found that a truant child may not be detained with-
out adequate psychiatric treatment.' 6 In both decisions the court
relied on a District of Columbia statute which provides that when
8. Eidenoff v. Connolly, 281 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Tex. 1968); Nason v. Superin-
tendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
9. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
10. Id. at 784. The court in Wyatt went on to discuss the constitutional neces-
sity of treatment.
Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because,
absent treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where
one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense.. ."
Id., quoting Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
The court further stated:
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that
the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide
adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process.
325 F. Supp. at 785.
11. Cf. 325 F. Supp. at 785.
12. E.g., Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
13. People v. Wilkins, 23 App. Div. 2d 178, 259 N.Y.S.2d 462 (4th Dep't 1965).
14. In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d 470 (1958).
15. Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
16. In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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a child is removed from his home the court must supply custody,
care, and discipline as close as possible to that which the parents
should give. 17 The court found necessary psychiatric treatment to
be within the meaning of the statute. 18
In construing a Rhode Island statute19 almost identical to the
District of Columbia's, however, a federal district court based its
decision not on the statute alone, but on mental patients' pro-
cedural due process and equal protection rights. 20 The court noted
that juveniles actually receive fewer procedural safeguards than
criminals because of the state's parens patriae goal of protecting
and rehabilitating juveniles. It held that due process and equal
protection require rehabilitation since, otherwise, there would
be no rational basis for depriving juveniles of adults' procedural
rights. 21 The court also found the cruel and unusual punishment
clause 22 applicable to juveniles despite the ostensibly non-punitive
character of juvenile confinement. 23 . This case, thus, went well
beyond its predecessors by finding a general constitutional right
to rehabilitation, rather than a narrow statutory right to psychiatric
treatment.
17. DS.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-2316(3) (1973) states:
[W]hen the child is removed from his own family, the court shall secure
for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to
that which should have been given him by his parents.,
18. 382 F.2d at 127. In In re Tsesmilles, 24 Ohio App. 2d 153, 265 N.E.2d 308
(1970), the court found rehabilitation to be the sole statutory purpose for commit-
ment of teenage felons "to a maximum security institution operated by the de-
partment of mental hygiene and correction .... ." Id. at 155, 265 N.E.2d at 310,
quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355(E) (Page Supp. _ ). (Section
2151.355(E) was amended in 1973 and the above quoted phrase now reads: "to an
institution operated by the Ohio youth commission . OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.355(E) (Page Supp. 1973).)
19. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-2 (1969) states:
The purpose of this chapter is to secure for each child under its jurisdiction
such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will serve
the child's welfare and the best interests of the state; to conserve and
strengthen the child's family ties wherever possible, removing him from
the custody of his parents only when his welfare or the safety and protec-
tion of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without such removal
and, when such child is removed from his own family, to secure for him
custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which
should have been given by his parents.
20. Inmates v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
21. 346 F. Supp. at 1364-67.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. 346 F. Supp. at 1366. As part of the remedy the court ordered psychiatric
counseling for juvenile inmates and said that after more testimony it would order
a general rehabilitation plan. As in other cases, this court stressed that continued
1974] 277
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Many state statutes also require special treatment for defec-
tive delinquents. For example, the Maryland Defective Delin-
quent Act allows indefinite commitment of anyone who "evidences
a propensity toward criminal activity, and . . . [has] intellectual
deficiency or emotional unbalance .... "24 The statute allows a
person to be confined after a judicial hearing if convicted of fel-
onies, serious misdemeanors, violent crimes, some sex offenses, or
more than two crimes punishable by imprisonment. 25 The Fourth
Circuit found the Act constitutional on its face, but held that lack
of treatment for treatable inmates would constitute a denial of
equal protection. 26 The court said that the prospect of treatment
is the only justification for handling curable defective delinquents
differently from other convicts. Absent treatment, it stated, the
Act would discriminate unjustifiably against curable defective
delinquents.2 7
The treatment group rationale should apply to prisoners. But
in order to do so, the courts must recognize the similarities be-
tween these two groups. Realistically, the consequences of con-
finement are the same for members of both groups. The courts
already view loss of freedom as a heavy deprivation in itself,2 8
and the physical conditions of confinement are often as bad for
abuse of the juveniles could not be excused on the ground "that the representatives
of the state were doing the best they could." Id. at 1374.
In United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971) the court found
that crowding and misapplication of resources at the Lorton Youth Center frus-
trated the mandatory language of the District of Columbia Youth Corrections Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 5011-14, 5025 (1970), requiring authorities to provide rehabilitation
for youths. The court, in addition to referring to the statute, spoke generally about
the need to rehabilitate youthful offenders, implying that the eighth amendment
requires it: "The Constitution, the Youth Corrections Act, and the conscience of a
civilized society require that youth offenders receive firm but effective opportunity
for treatment and realistic rehabilitation." 336 F. Supp. at 983.
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1971).
25. Id. § 6a.
26. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964), dismissed on remand, 295
F. Supp. 389 (D. Md. 1969), affd sub nom. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153
(4th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 404 U.S.
999 (1971), cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
27. Id. at 513-14. It could be argued that the indefinite sentence of defective
delinquents is only a form of the typically more severe sentences given to multiple
offenders under habitual offender statutes. But the statute can still be attacked on
the ground that the eighth amendment forbids indefinite confinement without
treatment. Also, the purpose of the statute is clearly to rehabilitate, not to increase
severity of punishment for incorrigibles.
28. For instance, Rouse v. Cameron stressed this problem in connection with
mental patients. 373 F.2d at 455.
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non-prisoners as for prisoners. 2 9 Moreover, the treatment group's
prospect of indefinite commitment and its subjection to so-called
therapies-such as lobotomy, electroshock, and aversion therapy-
may be worse than anything criminals encounter. 30 Finally, the
stigma of confinement is as great for the "treatment" group as for
prisoners.
In re Gault3 ' rejected the distinction between parens patriae
power and punishment. In extending the procedural due process
safeguards of criminal procedure to juvenile offenders, the Su-
preme Court found that the similarity in the actual conditions of
confinement of prisoners and juvenile offenders is more important
than the difference in purported purposes of confinement.32 In
Heryford v. Parker,3 3 the Tenth Circuit also found the use of a
"civil" label irrelevant in proceedings for commitment of retarded
and disturbed juveniles. Regardless of its purpose, the court said,
potential confinement requires procedural due process. 3 4 At least
one federal judge has stated flatly that any confinement is punish-
ment from the viewpoint of the person confined. 35
The final step in the application of this doctrine to prisoners
may come when courts abandon the notion that members of the
treatment group are confined prospectively because of their po-
tentially anti-social future, while criminals are confined retrospec-
tively because of their demonstrably anti-social past. Correctional
theory is actually more prospective than it might first appear. The
public expects further misconduct from convicts, as evidenced by
its pressure to lock them up. Indeed, this expectation of further
29. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
30. In fact, these treatments might constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
See note 171 infra.
31. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
32. Id. at 27-28.
33. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
34. Id. at 396.
In State ex rel. Bernal v. Hershman, 54 Wis. 2d 626, 196 N.W.2d 721 (1972), the
court said placement of a juvenile offender in his mother's custody is analogous to
the probation of an adult. Therefore, when faced with the revocation of his status,
the juvenile is entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult. Id. at 630,
196 N.W.2d at 724.
35. The court in Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1969) stated:
"Incarceration may not seem 'punishment' to the jailors, but it is punishment to
the jailed." Similarly, in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967), the Supreme
Court found the use of labels irrelevant in connection with commitment pro-
ceedings under the Colorado Sex Offender Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1
to -10 (1963).
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misconduct is basic to all accepted correctional theories. The
rationale for isolating prisoners from the public, thus, rests on a
desire to protect the public from their further misdeeds. This
theory also assumes that the convict might repeat his crimes unless
discouraged by the possibility of a stay in prison. Likewise, the
rationale for rehabilitation is avoidance of further misconduct.
The only correctional theory which lacks a prospective element is
retribution, and many courts now take a dim view of this theory. 36
Some cases have applied the treatment philosophy to hybrids
of treatment and imprisonment situations. In Sas v. Maryland37
the prison was styled as therapeutic, but the plaintiffs were labelled
criminals and were subjected to punishment. They differed from
other criminals, if at all, because of their incorrigibility or mental
illness. Although Sas interpreted the Maryland Defective Delin-
quent Act 38 as designed primarily for isolation and secondarily for
treatment, the court still required the state to treat the treatable
inmates. 39 This attitude demonstrates that a court might extend a
right to rehabilitation to other prisoners without the need to es-
tablish rehabilitation as the main reason for confinement. Reha-
bilitation would only have to be one of several mandatory correc-
tional goals, rather than the sole objective.
Thus, courts have moyed correctional theory in the direction
of rehabilitation by recognizing realistically the similarities be-
tween prisoners and members of the treatment group, similarities
the courts can use to extend the right of rehabilitation to prisoners.
Previously, except for the justification of both groups' confinement
for the public safety, they were far apart in theoretical emphasis.
Though treatment philosophy stresses rehabilitation, prison cases
gave it only a minor role until recently. An early Virginia case set
the tone by describing convicts as "slaves of the state," with no
rights but those which the state chooses to confer. 40 Many cases
36. See p. 282 & note 48 infra. See also Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d
Cir. 1967).
37. 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964). In Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, the
court stressed the hybrid character of Patuxent. Patuxent was a medically-oriented
institution whose purpose was treatment, and commitment to it was by a civil, rather
than a criminal, proceeding. The court called it an encouraging approach to reha-
bilitation of criminals, and intimated that without adequate treatment there would
be serious constitutional problems with Patuxent. Id. at 1158 & n.18.
38. MD. ANN. CODE arts. 31B et seq. (1971).
39. 334 F.2d at 516.
40. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
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still reflect this view.41 Thus, criminal law's traditional focus on
punishment stressed goals which were ostensibily irrelevant to the
treatment philosophy. Since prisoners received only their just des-
serts, prison security and disciplinary measures could be extreme-
ly harsh. Retribution and deterrence were the main goals; rehabil-
itation was expendable if it conflicted with administrative conve-
nience, security needs, or other penal interests.
B. Equal Protection
Recent prison cases have replaced the "slave" theory with
the view, first enunciated in Coffin v. Reichard,42 that prisoners
retain all civil rights except those expressly taken by law or those
whose removal is necessary to the attainment of legitimate penal
goals. 43 The impact of this shift depends upon the judicial inter-
pretation of "necessary" and "legitimate" penal goals. With re-
gard to first amendment rights some courts have defined the terms
very favorably for prisoners. For example, the First Circuit found
no necessity which could justify state limitations on inmates' rights
to correspond with news media about prison conditions. 44
Morales v. Schmidt 45 took Coffin to the furthest extreme
yet. The district court there began from the premise that convicts
and the general public are entitled to the same rights. Depriving
41. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (deterrence is important
function of the corrections system); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (retribution still has a legitimate place in criminal law); Ru-
dolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (Goldberg, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 275
Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662 (1963) (deterrence and rehabilitation are legitimate penal
goals); Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (purpose of prisons is
the punishment of criminals); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880,
100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (retribution may be one, but
not the sole, penal goal).
42. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
43. Id. at 445.
44. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
On the same question, Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880, 887 (W.D.N.Y.
1972), formulated the rigorous test of "a clear and present danger of breach of the
security, discipline or orderly administration of the institution .. " And in a con-
text closely related to prisons, Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
found that parolees retain all rights of free speech unless the government can
show specific, highly likely dangers of misconduct by the parolee.
However, several recent Supreme Court decisions have evidenced a somewhat
more conservative attitude towards prisoners' first amendment rights. See Wolff v.
McDonnell, __ U.S. - (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
45. 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), reo'd, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973).
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convicts of rights, the court held, is a discrimination subject to
the same equal protection test as singling out other groups of
citizens for deprivations. With relatively unimportant privileges,
the government needs to show only a reasonable relation between
the .deprivation and a legitimate governmental purpose. 46 But
when fundamental individual rights are at stake, the government
must demonstrate a compelling interest which it is advancing in
the least disruptive way. 47
The court applied this general framework to its analysis of
restrictions on prisoners. It found the main governmental interest
in corrections to be protection of the public, which it accepted
as a compelling state interest. It viewed the other usually accepted
purposes of prisons-isolation of offenders from the public, inflic-
tion of hardship to deter convicts, deterrence of others through
present convicts' sufferings, and rehabilitation 4 8-not as correc-
tional goals, but as mere strategies to achieve the basic goal of
public protection. Indeed, it saw prison itself as a substructure
for implementing these four basic strategies. Prison rules and
regulations were simply the measures which prisons need to
function. 49
This approach was unique because most other courts had
viewed deterrence, rehabilitation, and confinement as ultimate
penal goals. Other courts had assumed that the justification of
the prison's existence was not an issue in prisoners' rights suits.5 0
Though Morales accepted protection of the public as a com-
pelling state interest, it held that the other strategies are con-
stitutional only when pursued in a permissible manner--i. e., when
a restriction actually protects the public, is implemented in the
least onerous way, and preserves human dignity. 51 Thus, although
a particular strategy might be constitutionally acceptable per se,
it can be applied only sparingly.
46. 340 F. Supp. at 550.
47. Id.
48. The court found revenge to be a goal of dubious legitimacy. Id. at 551 n.6.
49. Id. at 553.
50. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
51. For example, even though deterrence might be highly effective if prisons
provided elaborate psychological and physical tortures, the court was
inclined to the view that deterrence can constitutionally justify little more
than physical confinement itself and a relatively spartan regime within
the prison in terms of the amenities.
Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. at 552.
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The Morales decision, however, was reversed on appeal. 52
The Seventh Circuit decided that for purposes of equal protection
convicts do not retain all the rights of other citizens, 53 and that a
right can be fundamental for general citizens but not for prisoners.
The court did not hold, however, that every state interest justifies
restrictions on prisoners. 54 The court of appeals dealt only with
correspondence rights and deliberately excluded consideration of
inmate correspondence to courts, lawyers, and public officials.
55
This exclusion gives future courts the opportunity to include selec-
tively other rights in the group of fundamental interests.
Although it did not adopt the district court's radical view of
prisons, the Seventh Circuit showed that it would, nevertheless,
protect prisoners' rights. 56 It rejected the government's desire
for a return to the "hands off' doctrine, and noted that
a district court should scrutinize closely the justifications
offered by the state for the limitation. Its review must
"be more than an obeisance to a warden's asserted ex-
pertise . . . .57
The court retreated only to the level of other progressive decisions
and left the door open to new prisoners' rights. If nothing else,
the district court demonstrated that the judiciary can adopt a
radical view of prisoners' rights. Indeed, other cases show that
courts can treat prisoners as inferior to other citizens and still
defend inmates' rights vigorously. 58
52. Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973).
53. The Morales court also stated:
The Supreme Court has indicated that the constitutional limitations on
governmental actions differ depending on the role in which the govern-
ment is acting in a particular case. This is so despite the fact that each
situation might involve the same constitutional interest of the affected
individuals.
Id. at 1342.
54. Id. at 1343.
55. Id. at 1339 n.6.
56. For instance, the court cited Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) for
approval of "traditional" parole conditions. Id. at 1342. It is likely that the court of
appeals would also approve the "traditional" general format of prisons.
57. 489 F.2d at 1343. But see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05
(1974).
58. For instance, Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969), dealing
with Black Muslims' rights to religious freedom, stated that
the mere fact that government, as a practical matter, stands a better chance
of justifying a curtailment of fundamental liberties where prisoners are
1974]
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Under an approach somewhat less radical than that of the
Morales district court, a court could abandon general society as
the frame of reference and require that prisoners receive the same
care as members of the treatment group. A court could find that
prisoners and members of the treatment group are similarly sit-
uated in all fundamental respects: they share loss of liberty, con-
ditions of confinement, and social stigmatization. A court could
recognize that, in reality, members of the treatment group, like
prisoners, are confined with considerable punitive effect.
Courts could follow the Morales equal protection theory to
find that rehabilitation, as a method of public protection, is the
primary correctional goal.5 9 Depriving prisoners of rehabilitation,
therefore, would deny them equal protection if an almost identical
right to rehabilitation applies to similarly situated non-prisoners.6 0
Since rehabilitation would be a primary penal purpose, depriving
prisoners of rehabilitation would not be reasonably related to the
governmental purpose of imprisonment. If prisoners have a fun-
damental interest in anything, they have it in rehabilitation, es-
involved does not eliminate the need for reasons imperatively justifying
the particular retraction of rights challenged at bar. Nor does it lessen
governmental responsibility to reduce the resulting impact upon those
rights to the fullest extent consistent with the justified objective.
Id. at 1000-01. Thus, the court found freedom of religion to be a first amendment
right of prisoners which the state could limit only upon a showing of "compelling
state interest" and employment of the "least restrictive alternative." See also
Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971).
One court required a compelling state interest to justify limitation of prisoners'
religious freedom, freedom of speech and association, and freedom from racial
classification. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. at 644. The Landman court then
went on to observe that some states "have not shown such remarkable success in
achieving any , . . valid penological end .... " Id. It noted that courts would "in-
quire as to the need for such sacrifices and the reality of the claimed [state] bene-
fits." Id. at 653.
59. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 420 (N.D. Tex. 1972). Brown v.
Peyton, 437 F.2d at 1230-31, found that:
[olne of the principal purposes of incarceration is rehabilitation....
. . Prison authorities have a legitimate interest in the rehabilitation of
prisoners, and may legitimately restrict freedoms in order to further this
interest, where a coherent, consistently-applied program of rehabilitation
exists....
In the recent case of Procunier v. Martinez the Court said: "The identifiable
governmental interests . . . [include] the rehabilitation of the prisoners." 416 U.S.
at 412.
60. Cf. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Although
treatment is not synonymous with rehabilitation (it probably implies a greater
medical orientation and sometimes a higher degree of mental disorder), the con-
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pecially when lack of rehabilitation greatly hinders reintegration
into society. Thus, the government would find it more difficult to
show that it has a compelling interest and is pursuing it by the
least onerous means.
-The Morales approach does not rely upon, but is bolstered
by, this analogy to the treatment group. As a disadvantaged sector
of the non-criminal population, the treatment group with its right
to treatment emphasizes prisoners' deprivation.
Indeed, the very existence of the treatment group also belies
any argument that denial of rehabilitation does not deprive pris-
oners of equal protection because the general public has no such
right. The treatment group is just non-prisoners who are officially
found in need of services, deprived of their freedom and, thus,
entitled to such services. The general public, therefore, has an
affirmative right to treatment under at least certain circumstances.
Unlike a prisoner, the ordinary citizen is not affirmatively
restrained from seeking rehabilitation; at worst, his circumstances
prevent him from obtaining services. By removing a prisoner's
ability to find appropriate services, a prison arguably incurs the
responsibility of making these services available. Indeed, the
courts have recognized the validity of the military's providing
such services. 61
The Morales equal protection formulation has several advan-
tages over the treatment analogy. The treatment cases do not have
a unifying legal theory.6 2 Using the treatment group as the pri-
mary reference in an equal protection argument creates difficulties,
cepts overlap in many respects. For example, both can include psychiatric treat-
ment and psychological counseling, social work services, occupational therapy,
and job training. Additionally, some treatment cases have already dealt with reha-
bilitation. The Affleck court demonstrated its intention to order a full program of
rehabilitation. 346 F. Supp. at 1374. The Alsbrook court also ordered rehabilitation.
336 F. Supp. at 979.
61. Cf. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 n.10 (1962). The
military, by limiting access to civilian religious services and the clergy, incurs the
burden of providing its own services and clergy. Crawford, Prisoner's Rights-A
Prosecutor's View, 16 Vill. L. Rev. 1055, 1065-66 (1971). See generally Figinski,
Military Chaplains-A Constitutionally Permissible Accommodation Between
Church and State, 24 Md. L. Rev. 377 (1964).
62. Reference to the "treatment" group relies on an array of legal arguments
patched into a more technicality-based conclusion. The best arguments will fail
if the court has not yet changed its basic approach to prisoners. For instance,
McLamore v. State, 257 S.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 250 (1972) held that there is no con-
stitutional duty to rehabilitate prisoners, so the state can give as much or little
rehabilitation as it pleases. But the right-privilege distinction is not conclusive.
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since the treatment group is a continually changing body which
still has fewer rights than the general public. By using the general
public as their frame of reference, courts would lay the ground-
work for extending many other civilian rights to prisoners.
The Morales theory also promotes continuity in prison reform
by completing the prisoner's advancement from a "slave of the
state" to a citizen who loses only those rights whose taking is es-
sential to achieve legitimate penal goals. By following the pro-
gression of prison cases and confronting the crucial issue of prison
reform-the courts' basic attitudes towards prisoners-Morales
encourages the development of a coherent body of law regarding
prison's legitimate ends and permissible means.
Like Morales, the treatment group cases indicate that courts
should require prisons to show that they have used the least re-
strictive alternative, and not just that they have a compelling state
interest.63 Most observers have assumed that the two criteria are
inseparable, since they have been used together. As Singer points
out, however, they are conceptually distinguishable.6 4 A court
might allow a state to limit prisoners' rights when merely a rational
state interest is involved, but it might still require the state to em-
ploy the least restrictive alternative in pursuing that interest.
Bullock v. Carter65 advocates "close scrutiny" of a state's means
for pursuing "legitimate" as opposed to "compelling" interests.6 6
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969) suggested that even if a state need not extend
the privilege, once it does,'it cannot extend it discriminatorily.
The MeLamore court also cited the high cost to the state of having to provide
rehabilitation for all prisoners. This expense argument, typically used against the
granting of many prisoners' rights, can be countered. First, in the long run it would
be cheaper to rehabilitate criminals than to confine them. Second, all prisoners
need not receive the most expensive rehabilitation programs. The court apparently
assumed that an expensive rehabilitation program for one prisoner would force the
state to be as elaborate for all prisoners, regardless of the other prisoners' needs.
Finally, the court chose not to draw on ample authority for the proposition that
mere considerations of convenience and cost cannot limit prisoners in the exercise
of their constitutional rights.
63. Compare Morales with Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
and Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and Lake v. Cameron,
364 F.2d 657, 659-61 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See generally Singer, Sending Men to
Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least
Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 51, 55-64 (1972).
64. Singer, supra note 63, at 58.
65. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
66. Id. at 144.
The Morales court of appeals might have intended a similar standard when it
limited the use of the "compelling state interest," but still called for "close scru-
tiny" of state imposed limitations on prisoners' rights. 489 F.2d at 1341. Landman
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The treatment group cases, therefore, could extend the least re-
strictive alternative standard to deprivation of prisoners' physical
freedom. Indeed, several treatment cases have applied precisely
this standard in determining the kind of treatment required. In
several cases the District of Columbia Circuit relied upon a local
statute in requiring the government to show that it was using the
mildest possible form of confinement, and the court at least implied
a constitutional basis for its conclusion. 67
The courts also could apply the least restrictive alternative
standard to broader areas of convicts' lives. 68 If a court determined
that prisoners and treatment group members were similarly
v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 96-97, 99 (E.D. Va. 1973) insisted on the least drastic
deprivation of prisoners' rights, although the court did not specifically espouse
across-the-board application of the "compelling state interest" standard.
67. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Covington v. Harris,
419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Covington court implied a constitutional basis
for its conclusion:
The new legislation apart, however, the principle of the least restrictive
alternative consistent with the legitimate purposes of a commitment
inheres in the very nature of civil commitment, which entails an extra-
ordinary deprivation of liberty justifiable only when the respondent is
"mentally ill to the extent that he is likely to injure himself or other persons
if allowed to remain at liberty." A statute sanctioning such a drastic cur-
tailment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly, con-
strued in order to avoid deprivations of liberty without due process of law.
Id. at 623. Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1970) cited Lake to show that
the "least restrictive alternative" was a legitimate issue in the habeas corpus
petition of a patient who had been hospitalized after an acquittal on the insanity
plea. Id. at 597 n.27.
It might be argued that Dixon was clearly meant to apply only to civil commit-
ment. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 63, at 62. The court seemed to have specified
that criminal commitment was distinguishable from the present case.
It is clear on this record that disputed issues of fact and law [exist] ....
Confinement of the mentally ill rests upon a basis substantially different
from that which supports confinement of those convicted of crime ...
Confinement of the mentally ill . . . depends not only upon the validity
of the initial commitment but also upon the continuing status of the patient.
427 F.2d at 595. But this conclusion is not inevitable. Judge Bazelon, who wrote
the majority opinion, has argued elsewhere that the confinement of civil and
criminal mental patients is indeed very similar. See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing
the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CH. L. REv. 742, 748-49, 752-53 (1969). Further,
the distinction appears to have been mainly intended to justify the court's jurisdic-
tion in the matter, rather than to exclude the "least restrictive alternative" test
from being applied to criminal confinement. The court apparently was dealing only
with the question of when the patient can raise the issue, and not whether he can.
68. Of some help in making the connection is Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp.
1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971), in which the court found the principle of the least restric-
tive alternative applicable to the confinement of pre-trial detainees. While pre-
trial detainees are in theory entitled to more extensive rights than convicts, this
case shows that at least one court felt competent to apply the principle to broad
areas of prison life.
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situated, the treatment group's right to greater physical freedom
would apply equally to prisoners. 69 This requirement would open
up a right to rehabilitation for all convicts thereby released to the
community. 70 Besides having the same access to community re-
habilitation programs as other citizens, they would benefit further
because most community-based corrections projects lean heavily
toward rehabilitation.
Finally, the simplest application of equal protection would be
to require a liberal construction of state constitutional and statu-
tory references to rehabilitation for prisoners71-just as Rouse
did for members of the treatment group. One problem with cases
decided under even very liberal state statutes is that they usually
arise in state courts, which are often more conservative than federal
courts. Nevertheless, a state court could give liberal construction
to treatment statutes. A variation of the statutory argument relies
upon the avowed purpose of correctional statutes-the protection
of the public. The reasoning is simply that since almost all pris-
69. Singer argues that most convicts could be on non-prison status without
extra danger to the community. Singer, supra note 63, at 79-81.
70. The Supreme Court has further said that a primary purpose of parole is
already recognized to be rehabilitation. Probation, too, stresses the goal of reha-
bilitation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
71. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 11; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 24; N.C. CONST. art.
XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 18; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 15; Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 16;
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1-2022,-2032 (West 1970); N.Y. CORREc. LAW § 136 (McKinney
Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-31 (Supp. 1973); TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.02
(Vernon 1973).
Delaware provides for a "Department of Correction . . . to provide for the treat-
ment, rehabilitation and restoration of offenders as useful, law-abiding citizens
within the community." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 6501 (Supp. 1971). The Com-
missioner is directed to provide for "[t]he custody, study, training, treatment,
correction and rehabilitation of persons committed to the Department." Id. §
6517(3). And prisoners
shall be dealt with humanely, with effort directed to their rehabilitation, to
effect their return to the community as safely and promptly as practicable.
The Commissioner shall establish the following programs: . . . education,
including vocational training; work; case work counseling and psycho-
therapy ....
Id. § 6531.
N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 136 (McKinney Supp. 1973) provides that "each prisoner
shall be given a program of education which, on the basis of available data, seems
most likely to further the process of socialization and rehabilitation." Arkansas'
statutes recognize rehabilitation as an essential part of its correctional system.
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-100, -116 (Cum. Supp. 1973). And the California Penal Code
declares that the main purpose of San Quentin and Folsom prisons "shall be to pro-
vide confinement, industrial and other training, treatment, and care to persons
confined therein." CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1-2022, -2032 (West 1970).
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oners return to society, society has an interest in insuring their
rehabilitation. Courts and penologists increasingly recognize that
the correctional system merely delays or even increases a pris-
oner's ultimate harm to society unless it provides rehabilitation.
Without effective rehabilitation programs, prisons do not fulfill
their statutory mandate to implement society's statutory right
to self-defense. 72
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Prison administrators were, until recently, virtually immune
from the limitations of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 73
Courts used the slave of the state theory to avoid acting on all but
the most serious violations of prisoners' rights, such as severe
physical brutality. 74 Indeed, as late as 1967, the Second Circuit
72. It has been suggested that "societal self defense" is a basis for the treatment
cases and that these cases provide support for applying the same rationale to
criminal rehabilitation. See Comment, A Statutory Right to Treatment for Pris-
oners: Society's Right of Self Defense, 50 NEB. L. REV. 543 (1971). But while the
treatment cases recognized the social benefits of treatment, they focused primarily
on the patient's individual rights.
Dictum in Tippett v. Maryland shows judicial recognition of rehabilitation's
benefits to society:
The result [of lack of rehabilitation], of course, is a grave wrong for those
convicts who could be helped by getting help. It is a grave wrong to society,
which must suffer their continued depredations when released from prison
until they are confined again.
The interests of society and of the prison population demand the sort of
innovative reappraisal of our correctional institutions . . . for which Chief
Justice [Burger] has pled.
436 F.2d at 1158.
Unfortunately, however, only a few statutes provide explicitly for such a con-
cept. Self-defense often commingles with goals of custody, security, and deten-
tion. Moreover, if a statute includes a societal right to self-defense, it usually will
also stress rehabilitation-in language which courts would be more likely to rely on.
Language like Vermont's is probably most useful in providing statutory support
for the Morales premise that the basic goal of corrections is protection of society.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974) states:
The department of corrections . . . shall have the purpose of developing
and administering a correctional program designed to protect persons and
property against offenders of the criminal law and to render treatment to
offenders with the goal of achieving their successful return and participa-
tion as citizens of the state and community, to foster their human dignity
and to preserve the human resources of the community.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241
(1972); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
74. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871); cf. Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910). Courts unswervingly followed this with
the notable exception of Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), which dealt with
loss of citizenship as a punishment.
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broke radically new ground merely by finding solitary confine-
ment unconstitutional in some situations. 75 The general shift away
from the slave of the state theory, however, has increased the
viability of the cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Despite its limited use, the clause is an appropriate vehicle
for creating a right to rehabilitation. First, the courts have always
stressed the clause's flexibility. 76 In Furman v. Georgia,77 Justice
Marshall advocated perhaps its most flexible interpretation. Be-
cause of its dependence on society's evolving standards, he found
stare decisis to be of limited use in construing the clause. Both
Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan maintained that the Court
should not interpret the clause simply in terms of "conventional
wisdom," but rather that it should make an independent judg-
ment in light of conventional wisdom. 78 In creating a right to re-
75. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
76. In Weems v. United States the government contended that the clause re-
ferred only to extreme tortures which were already prohibited when the Constitution
was written. But the Supreme Court said:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true,
from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore,
be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. There-
fore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions ...
217 U.S. at 373.
The clause of the Constitution in the opinion of the learned commentators
may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice.
Id. at 378. In Weems the clause was violated because the punishment was far out
of proportion to the crime.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100-01, reiterated Weems's position on the flexibility
of the clause. The Court stressed interpretation in light of "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 101. This doctrine has
been restated in various forms by subsequent cases, including Holt v. Sarver, 300
F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Holt I], on rehearing, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Holt II], affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971), which said: "the concept of cruel and unusual punishment is a flexible
and expanding one .... 300 F. Supp. at 827.
77. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
78. Mr. Justice Marshall noted that:
[A) penalty that was permissible at one time ... is not necessarily permis-
sible today....
The fact, therefore, that the Court, or individual Justices, may have
in the past expressed an opinion that the death penalty is constitutional
is not now binding on us....
. . . [U]nless a very recent decision existed, stare decisis would bow to
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habilitation, a court would thus be free to transcend the lowest
common denominator of public opinion.
This view obviously gives courts extreme latitude. The Su-
preme Court of California took precisely this approach and dis-
regarded stare decisis in holding the death penalty unconstitu-
tional.79 That court also discounted several commonly accepted
indices of public opinion, such as polls, legislative enactments, and
appellate decisions.8 0 According to the court, these factors do
not demonstrate public acceptance of the death penalty. This
approach (independent judgment in light of conventional wisdom)
allows a court to apply its own legal judgment to cq.ntemporary
social values and to use its own methods to determine those
values. 8' Even without such an extreme approach, the clause is
highly maleable because of its inconsistent history. The very
vagueness of its standards makes the clause exceptionally open to
"judicial legislation." Since the courts have only recently made
extensive use of the clause, they have developed few criteria for
interpreting its broad language. Alternatively, because the clause's
extreme flexibility makes it suitable for innovation, courts may
changing values, and the question of the constitutionality of capital
punishment.., would remain open.
Id. at 329-30.
Other opinions in Furman resemble Justice Marshall's in their focus on changing
values. Mr. Justice Brennan referred to statistics indicating that public acceptance
of the death penalty had decreased. Id. at 295-300.
79. People v.-Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
80. The court stated:
Nor are public opinion polls about a process which is far removed from the
experience of those responding helpful in determining whether capital
punishment would be acceptable to an informed public were it even-
handedly applied to a substantial proportion of the persons potentially
subject to execution. Although the death penalty statutes do remain on
the books of many jurisdictions, and public opinion polls show opinion
to be divided as to capital punishment as an abstract proposition, the in-
frequency of its actual application suggests that among those persons called
upon to actually impose or carry out the death penalty it is being repudiated
with ever increasing frequency....
What our society does in actuality belies what it says with regard to its
acceptance of capital punishment.
Id. at 648-49, 493 P.2d at 894, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
81. This position contrasts with the more conventional view of Sostre v. Mc-
Ginnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) which looked
to historic usage, practices of other jurisdictions, and present public opinion to
determine whether a punishment violated the standards of a civilized society.
Id. at 191.
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view it as a carte blanche and use it with great caution. The courts
can create some order, however, by building on the clause's re-
cently increased application to conditions of confinement, partic-
ularly those challenges to over-all conditions in local jails. These
cases have considered lack of rehabilitation as one factor comprising
cruel and unusual punishment, although no decision has rested
squarely on this question.8 2
A few courts have applied the clause more directly. In Holt
II,83 the plaintiffs alleged that there were atrocities throughout
the Arkansas penal system-e.g., assaults, corrupt inmate trusty
guards, bag physical conditions, and lack of rehabilitation pro-
grams. The court ordered the state to correct these deficiencies,
holding that confinement under these conditions is cruel and
unusual punishment. 84 Despite its boldness, however, Holt II still
limited itself to the physical conditions of confinement. The court
specifically stated that the mere lack of rehabilitative programs
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Lack of reha-
bilitative programs was one mark against the prisons, however,
and encouraged the court to conclude that such punishment was
cruel and unusual.8 5 The decision noted: "This court knows that a
sociological theory or idea may ripen into constitutional law;
82. Some recent cases include Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128
(N.D. Cal. 1972), which found that pre-trial detainees are subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment when they are held in filthy solitary confinement with no
exercise or rehabilitation. Hamilton v. Schirro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970),
ordered sub. nom. Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1973) found
that crowding, assaults, bad food, and the like made confinement in a Louisiana
prison cruel and unusual punishment. Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D.
Ark. 1971) was a similar case dealing with pre-trial detainees in Arkansas. In Rhem
v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), however, the court did not find
cruel and unusual punishment in the case of similar complaints about New York
City's "Tombs." The court said that conditions were not so outrageous as in other
cases, and the administration was working diligently to remedy the situation.
McLamore v. State, 257 S.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 250 (1972) raised the issue of reha-
bilitation and cruel and unusual punishment, but the court focused on equal pro-
tection, and merely concluded that there was "no constitutional duty" to provide
rehabilitation.
83. 309 F. Supp. at 379. The court stated that:
Given an otherwise unexceptional penal institution, the Court is not
willing to hold that confinement in it is unconstitutional simply because
the institution does not operate a school, or provide vocational training, or
other rehabilitative facilities and services which many institutions now
offer.
Id.
84. Id. at 385.
85. The court observed that:
The absence of an affirmative program of training and rehabilitation may
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many . ..have done so ... "88 Other courts have also indicated
that confinement without rehabilitation is constitutionally invalid.
In Newman v. Alabama87 the court held the whole Alabama
prison system unconstitutional, on the ground, primarily, that it
provided inadequate medical and psychiatric care. The court
stressed the fact that more than half the prison population was in
serious need of psychiatric treatment, and came close to the prop-
osition that all prisoners have a right to mental health care. 88 In-
deed, the court felt it "tautological that such [lack of] care is con-
stitutionally inadequate," 89 and in its decree specifically ordered
the prison system to hire a psychiatric staff.90
The eighth amendment can support a right to rehabilitation in
several ways. First, the courts might decide that evolving stan-
dards of society now require that right, as evidenced by the con-
sensus of penal experts in favor of rehabilitation and the trend
toward increased rights in all areas of prisoners' lives. 91 This
argument certainly would arouse caution in the courts, since it
requires broad judgments about society's values. But even if the
courts relied on a narrower rationale, this approach would support
the basic thrust of their decision.
have constitutional significance where in the absence of such a program
conditions and practices exist which actually militate against reform and
rehabilitation.
Id.
86. Id. On appeal, one judge maintained that the court should keep jurisdic-
tion over the penal system until it provided rehabilitation, programs. 442 F.2d at
310 (Lay J., concurring). And in Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 717 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), affd sub. nom., Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972), the
court held that a county jail could correct constitutional deficiencies only by in-
cluding work or study release programs.
The most direct statement regarding rehabilitation and cruel and unusual punish-
ment came in a concurring opinion of the court of appeals in Holt v. Sarver, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). The judge explained that no prison which lacked reha-
bilitation programs, however modem or well-staffed, could avoid the degradation
of its inmates which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing the district
court's opinion, the judge said: "Until immediate and continued emphasis is given
to an affirmative program of rehabilitation the district court should retain juris-
diction." Id. at 310.
87. 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
88. Id. at 284-86.
89. Id. at 284.
90. Id. at 286.
91. Several justices in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), took a similar
route when they presented evidence of increased public opinion which favored
the application of the eighth amendment to the death penalty. E.g., id. at 305
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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Second, the courts might hold that lack of rehabilitation is
cruel and unusual because it combines with other prison condi-
tions to militate against reform. Most prisons would be vulnerable
to this argument since they are underfunded, antiquated, and
overcrowded.92 Where a government lacks the funds for entirely
new facilities, courts may accept less expensive rehabilitation
programs as a cure for the constitutional infirmity.
In a third and broader argument, the courts might conclude
that even relatively well-run prisons prevent reform unless they
include extensive rehabilitation programs. Judge Lay noted re-
cently that "[i]mprisonment in buildings of newly laid brick with
the most rigid security will not alleviate the depravity and crim-
inality which are fostered by the Arkansas prison system." 93 An
extension of this reasoning would lead to the conclusion that in-
carceration is counter-productive, with or without rehabilitation
programs. Prettyman found that the Patuxent Institution has had
little success in combating recidivism, despite its effort at reha-
bilitation. 94
92. In Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971) the court observed:
Too many prisoners serve their allotted time and are released into society
with the same predisposition to anti-social conduct as they had before
their arrests. In all too many instances, imprisonment serves the converse
of the rehabilitative purpose, converting good prospects for rehabilitation
into hardened criminals.
Id. at 1158
Possibly the most striking evidence of prison's negative effect is found' in a
study of recidivism among prisoners released from Florida's prisons following
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). That case declared the right of Indigent
defendants in a state criminal prosecution to have counsel. Rather than retry all
those prisoners who had been convicted without counsel, the state simply re-
leased them. The study found that their recidivism rate was only one-half that of the
other prisoners who served their full sentences. See Singer, supra note 63, at 84-85.
93. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 310 (8th Cir. 1971), noted in 36 Mo. L. Rev.
576 (1971). Without meaningful working and learning situations, boredom and a
sense of futility might cause an otherwise adequate program to break down. In-
creased tension, for instance, might lead to assaults.
Plaintiffs in Campbell v. McGruder, Civ. No. 1462-71 (D.D.C., filed sub nom.
Campbell v. Rodgers, July 22, 1971), a currently pending suit seeking sweeping
improvements in the District of Columbia jail, make a similar argument, citing
various behavioral studies which demonstrate the detrimental effects of prolonged
confinement. Cf. 1 PRISON L. REP. 60, 62 (1971). Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp.
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) also used this argument regarding the ef-
fects of continued solitary confinement, citing psychiatric evidence of the damage
caused by long-term confinement without outside stimulation.
94. See Prettyman, The Indeterminate Sentence and the Right to Treatment,
11 AM. CaiM. L. REv. 7 (1972).
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A fourth approach to determining whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual focuses on the question whether the punish-
ment serves any valid correctional purpose. If rehabilitation were
viewed as the basic penal goal-or, at least one of several such
goals-then a punishment would be cruel and unusual unless it
substantially furthered rehabilitation. 95
Finally, Justice Brennan set up a number of sub-tests in Fur-
man v. Georgia to determine whether a punishment is "degrading
to the dignity of man." 96 He maintained that although a punish-
ment may not be clearly unconstitutional under any one test, a
marginal score on all tests could make it cruel and unusual. 97 Thus,
lack of rehabilitation might violate the eighth amendment by
virtue of its questionable value under all previously mentioned
tests.
D. The Fulfillment of Judicial Responsibility
The courts can also base a right to rehabilitation on their
power to assure that their sentences are carried out.98 In United
States v. Alsbrook9 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia intervened in the operation of a youth center
on the ground that its general article III judicial powers extended
to the correctional process. The court also found statutory sup-
port for its jurisdiction and rejected lack of funds as a defense. 100
95. Cases on other aspects of prison life may be relevant to this argument.
Morales v. Schmidt states that the constitutionality of prison restrictions depends
on whether the restriction bears a rational relationship to a justifiable purpose of
the state. 489 F.2d at 1343. If rehabilitation were to be viewed as the only justifi-
able purpose of imprisonment, then incarceration without rehabilitation might be
regarded as an eighth amendment violation. In Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228
(4th Cir. 1971), a prisoner sought an injunction against prison officials for restricting
his right to practice his religious beliefs. The Brown court stated that "devotion
to one's religious beliefs .... make[s] one a more ethical, intelligent, useful member
of society," id. at 1230, and that "[o]ne of the principal purposes of incarceration is
rehabilitation and rehabilitation is a moral and intellectual process." Id.
96. 408 U.S. at 271-81. Justice Brennan characterized the present death penalty
as an "unnecessary infliction of suffering." Id. at 281. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. at 101; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 366.
97. 408 U.S. at 282.
98. See Spaeth, The Courts' Responsibility for Prison Reform, 16 VILL. L. REV.
1031 (1971).
99. 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971).
100. Id. at 980. The court noted:
[A]s an Article III Court under the Constitution, this court is vested with
the "judicial power of the United States." This is a grant of inherent
authority to direct action which is found essential to the continued effec-
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In Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 101 the somewhat
unusual plaintiffs were judges of the Philadelphia Court of Com-
mon Pleas. They sought mandamus to compel the city council to
appropriate more money for the city's jails. The Superior Court
awarded almost two and one-half million dollars.' 0 2 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court affirmed, saying that as a co-equal branch
of government the judiciary can protect its ability to fulfill its basic
responsibility-"the efficient and expeditious administration of
Justice." 0 3 The court held that the threshold question was whether
the funds were "reasonably necessary,"'10 4 but once that was
shown, even Philadelphia's serious financial problems could not
excuse the legislature from providing the funds.' 0 5 This approach
resembles Wyatt's warning that mental patients have a greater
claim on state funds than do public works projects. 106
Both cases arguably differ in some respects from ordinary
prison situations. Alsbrook may be distinguished on the ground
that it dealt with youthful offenders rather than adult criminals;
the court was particularly concerned with youthful offenders be-
cause the statutory framework stressed the court's parens patriae
role in their rehabilitation. Carroll may be distinguishable on the
ground that many inmates were pre-trial detainees rather than
convicts. Since they were still in the trial process, the court might
have had a greater interest in their rights than those of convicts.
Courts are usually more solicitous of pre-trial detainees since they
have not yet been convicted and are not yet being punished.
tive functioning of the Federal Courts. The Court's supervisory powers
must be exercised to this end. Unless adequate facilities are made avail-
able, the court's role in sentencing becomes merely advisory and it loses
the "judicial power" to enforce its orders to commitment under the Act.
Id.
101. 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
102. Id. at 50, 274 A.2d at 196.
103. Id. at 53, 274 A.2d at 197. The court noted that
the power to tax involves the power to destroy .... A legislature has the
power of life and death over all the Courts and over the entire Judicial
system. Unless the Legislature can be compelled hy the Courts to provide
the money which is reasonably necessary for the proper functioning and
administration of the Courts, our entire Judicial system could be extirpated
and the Legislature could make a mockery of our form of Government
with its three co-equal branches ....
Id. at 57, 274 A.2d at 199.
104. Id. at 54, 274 A.2d at 198.
105. Id. at 56, 274 A.2d at 199.
106. 344 F. Supp. at 377.
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Nonetheless, both cases should apply to convicted adult pris-
oners. The Alsbrook court's constitutional power to supervise
its sentences is equally applicable to adult convicts. And the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reference to the "administration of
justice" apparently included convicts as well as pre-trial detainees;
the Philadelphia jails contain convicts, and the opinion did not
distinguish between the two groups.
Thus, if a court determined rehabilitation to be a mandatory
correctional goal, rehabilitation would become a basic sentencing
goal. A prison's failure to supply rehabilitation would then violate
the court's sentencing order as much as does a premature release
today.' 0 7 This theory would not be available, however, to courts
which clearly lack supervisory power over particular prisons, so
that a federal court could not intervene in a state prison.
More important, courts might shun a theory which allows any
branch of government to demand "reasonably necessary" funds,
fearing it will claim vast sums for whatever it deems "reasonably
necessary."' 08 This extension would represent a very substantial
and unlikely broadening, however, of the sentencing power theory.
In any case, a carefully constructed concept of "reasonable neces-
sity" could avoid most such problems.
III. REHABILITATION-THE REMEDY
A. Policy Problems
Courts have been slow to recognize prisoners' rights, partially
because of a reluctance to infringe on the prerogatives of prison
officials. For years courts deferred to administrators in the deter-
107. State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 30 Ariz. 332, 246 P. 1033 (1926)
held a jailor in contempt of court for violation of the sentencing order because he
released a prisoner before the sentence expired. See Ridgway v. Superior Court
of Yavapai County, 74 Ariz. 117, 245 P.2d 268 (1952).
108. Perhaps San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
40-44 (1973), forecloses such a possibility of suits by the executive seeking funds
for many broad services provided by the government. Possibly, then, for many
municipal services, the executive would have to show extreme conditions before
its inability to provide the services reached constitutional dimensions.
Also relevant is Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970), which noted that
the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public
welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.
While this statement affirms the power of the other branches vis-a-vis the courts,
it also shows that individuals do not have an unqualified right to such services. This
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mination of the measures necessary for prison management and
effective rehabilitation. The theory was that the administrators,
not the courts, were experts in the field.
Judge Bazelon recently pointed out, however, that courts
review highly technical determinations by other agencies, such
as the Interstate Commerce Commission, even though courts
also lack specific expertise in these areas. 10 9 If courts can func-
tion with such esoteric agencies, presumably they can do the same
with prisons. Judge Bazelon's approach has prevailed in recent
prisoners' rights cases. Courts no longer accept at face value ad-
ministrators' pleas of "convenience," "security," and "rehabilita-
tive necessity" to justify virtually any prison regulation."10
It might be argued that courts cannot set standards for reha-
bilitation, since to do so involves judgments on every phase of
prison life, such as physical and psychological environment, proper
educational programs, psychological counseling, and vocational
rehabilitation. Still broader questions arise as to whether these
programs can be carried out in prison at all, or whether new com-
munity-based detention facilities are required. In recent years,
however, the courts have proved to be quite competent in han-
dling problems of similar complexity. After all, in Brown v. Board
of Education"' the Supreme Court undertook part of the task of
liberating Black people from a centuries-long badge of slavery. In
doing so, the Court gave great discretion to the federal district
courts in fashioning practical remedies." 2
Aside from the question of determining standards, the most
difficult hurdle for the courts is the enforcement of the right to
rehabilitation. Courts well know the difficulties in obtaining funds
for broad prison overhaul; they are understandably reluctant to
limitation further differentiates the possible demands of the executive branch.
While both branches could base their demands on their inherent right to fulfill
their basic functions, the courts would have the added aspect of acting to imple-
ment services, e.g., rehabilitation, to which individual citizens have an unquali-
fied right.
109. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742,
743 (1969).
110. But cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974):
[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex ... Most require exper-
tise, comprehensive planning, and' the commitment of resources .. .For all
of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent
problems of prison administration and reform.
Id. at 404-05 (footnote omitted).
111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), affd on rehearing, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
112. 349 U.S. at 299-301.
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provoke full-scale confrontation with co-equal or even inferior
branches of government. Moreover, the courts are wary of be-
coming mired in making extensive and detailed changes in pris-
ons because of the extremely complex relationships between
administrators, guards, inmates, and the public. The courts have
been willing to clash with federal, state, and local governments,
however, on basic issues such as voting and civil rights.lla More-
over, in these battles courts have wielded a powerful and diverse
array of weapons. They have hardly been reluctant to intervene in
complex administrative structures. As will be noted later, a court
can reduce its need for expertise as well as the possibility of con-
frontation by casting upon prison systems the burden of formulating
specific rehabilitation plans.114
Neither of these problems, however, is insurmountable.
Several cases have already dealt with problems similar to those a
court would face in enforcing a right to rehabilitation. An analysis of
them will show the practicalities of the situation.
B. Judicial Responses
In Rouse v. Cameron"i 5 the District of Columbia Circuit
formulated broad guidelines for an adequate treatment program.
The court did not require the hospital to show that its program
would actually cure or improve the patient, "but only that there
[was] a bona fide effort to do so. . . ."116 The hospital had to pro-
vide "treatment which is adequate in light of present knowledge."-17
The court was aware that no clear definition of adequate treat-
ment exists. It still felt that it could render a reasoned decision
based on the best available information."i 8 The court indicated
that an adequate treatment program must consider each patient's
needs and review them periodically. The court also suggested
113. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
114. See pp. 300-02 infra.
115. 373 F.2d 451.
116. Id. at 456.
117. Id.
118. The court noted that:
It has been said that "the only certain thing that can be said about the
present state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that
science has not reached finality of judgment." But lack of finality cannot
relieve the court of its duty to render an informed decision. Counsel for
the patient and the government can be helpful in presenting pertinent data
concerning standards for mental care, and . . . the court may appoint
independent experts. Assistance might be obtained from such sources as
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creation "of permanent or rotating panels of experts" to advise on
treatment standards. 119
Wyatt v. Stickney 20 implemented many of the Rouse guide-
lines. The Wyatt court stated that involuntarily committed mental
patients "unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive
such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic
oppbrtunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condi-
tion. .. "121 The court gave the institution six months to reach
minimum constitutional treatment standards. The institution was
to propose minimum treatment standards and to report its progress
in implementing those standards.12 2
After the hospital filed its report six months later, it was found
that the institution had failed to remedy the constitutional de-
fects.123 The court found a number of "dehumanizing conditions,"
such as lack of privacy, overcrowding, and fire hazards. The ratio
of qualified staff to patients was so low that the court found effec-
tive treatment to be impossible. After criticizing the lack of in-
dividual treatment plans for each patient, it held a hearing for
the parties and numerous amici curiae to propose treatment stan-
dards and present expert testimony.1 24 As a result of the hearing
the court adopted detailed minimum standards. 125
the American Psychiatric Association, which has published standards and is
continually engaged in studying the problems of mental care....
Id. at 457, quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) (foot-
notes omitted).
119. 373 F.2d at 457 n.35.
120. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
121. Id. at 784.
122. Id. at 785-86.
123. Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
124. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The amici included the United States,
the American Ortho-psychiatric Association, the American Civil Liberties Union,
and the American Association on Mental Deficiency.
125. 344 F. Supp. 387, 391-92, 395-407.
Under the heading of Humane Psychological and Physical Environment, the
court enumerated a number of rights. These included: liberal visitation and tele-
phone rights, unrestricted rights to visit with attorneys and private mental health
professionals, and unrestricted correspondence rights with attorneys, private
physicians, courts, and government officials. The court defined standards and
procedures for administration of medication as well as for the imposition of physical
restraint and isolation. Id. at 399-402. The court forbade the employment of drastic
treatment measures or the use of patients as subjects for experiments without
the prior meaningful consent of the patient or his representative. Patients were
also to receive adequate care for any physical ailments. Id.
Regarding the institutions' physical plants, the court required that they be
designed to afford patients with comfort and safety, promote dignity, and ensure
privacy. The facilities were required to be designed to make a positive contribution
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The court's initial order and threat of further action apparently
had a strong positive impact on the hospital. Later, in a memoran-
dum to the court, 126 the amici curiae noted a number of improve-
ments. They reported that new officials had shown a strong
desire to upgrade the hospitals127 and that the new management's
high caliber would attract other qualified personnel. 128 Perhaps
most significantly, it noted that a marked decrease in patients
accompanied a sharp increase in staff.129
to the efficient attainment of the treatment goals of the hospital. The court estab-
lished the kind and numbers of staff which must be provided, and required the
hospital to provide on-going training for non-professional staff. It provided for the
examinations of all new patients and set up detailed requirements for individualized
treatment plans for each patient. Id. at 404-06.
The court created a human rights committee for each of the three defendant
facilities. Id. at 394. These standing committees were in effect ombudsmen for the
operation of the hospitals, and a source of relief for patients who felt that their
rights were being infringed. Periodic reports to the court by the committees have
been a primary source of information for the court, plaintiffs, and amici, and thus
have greatly increased the hospitals' accountability.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction against further commit-
ments to the institutions until the institutions provided adequate treatment. But
the court retained jurisdiction and required another six months' progress report.
Id. It made clear that plaintiffs' requests for further relief might still be imple-
mented. The court specifically stated that it would appoint a master if the hospitals
did not comply with the order, and it strongly implied that other measures might be
taken as well. Id. at 393.
126. Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Require Defendants To File
Further Reports Of Compliance With This Court's Order Of April 13, 1972, at, 2,
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
127.
[T]he new management team, led by Commissioner Aderholt, appears anxious
to comply with the standards at an early date. . . . [T]he morale has im-
proved. The Searcy Committee has stated that the court's Order "has trig-
gered exciting improvements throughout the entire hospital and has
initiated an esprit de corps that is stimulating the entire institution to-
ward achieving the goals."
Id. at 4.
128. According to the memorandum, "salary scales have been increased by
15%." Id. at 3.
129. The memorandum noted, however, that defendants still had a long way
to go before reaching complete compliance. Id. at 2. In general, the amici found
that the broad improvements which had been made were still incomplete and con-
crete steps were still needed actually to deliver adequate treatment to the patients.
They cited as the most pressing issue the fact that many patients were hospitalized
who should not have been. Id. at 5.
On the other hand, Dr. Roos stated that there were serious problems re-
maining: 1) "the physical plant is generally inept and ill-suited to imple-
mentation of current concepts of training and education"; 2) there is serious
overcrowding; 3) there is still an "alarming dearth of training and develop-
mental programming" in spite of greatly improved staffing; 4) dehumanizing
practices are still prevalent, especially in wards housing the severely and
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If courts can deal with the complexities of institutions for
the mentally ill and retarded, presumably they can deal with
prisons. Indeed, Holt H130 followed the Wyatt approach in hold-
ing that the entire Arkansas penal system constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. The Holt court ordered the prison to produce
plans for implementing the court's guidelines, while it retained
jurisdiction and ordered periodic progress reports. 131
Because of the similarities between Wyatt's institutions and
those of Holt, Wyatt's methods of determining and enforcing
standards could be instrumental in implementing a right to reha-
bilitation. A court could adopt almost in toto Wyatt's method of
setting standards for the medical and psychiatric aspects of prison
rehabilitation. Courts could use similar expert testimony to deter-
mine standards for physical conditions, psychological environ-
ment, and educational as well as occupational programs.1 32 The
Holt court in fact used just such reports and expert testimony.
As for enforcement of the right to rehabilitation, Wyatt and
the Holt cases indicate that courts can influence prison adminis-
trators significantly. Publicity and the threat of further sanctions
seem to be potent factors. 133 After Holt 11,134 the Arkansas legis-
profoundly retarded individuals; 5) "the proposed unitization now under-
way is questionable", and 6) "no long-range plan or specific objec-
fives for Partlow could be isolated" in spite of the overall state plan which
embodies many of the contemporary trends in mental retardation.
Id. at 5 (unnumbered footnote).
130. 309 F. Supp. 362.
131. Id. at 385.
132. Many relevant organizations, so far as expert testimony is concerned, are
listed in the COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STAN-
DARDS, published jointly in 1972 by the American Bar Association Commission
of Correctional Facilities and Services and the Council of State Governments.
The Compendium contains contributions from: Advisory Commission on Inter-
government Relations; American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice; Correctional Association (whose standards were adopted by the court in
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) as minimum standards for
confinement in isolation cells); American Law Institute; National Advisory Commis-
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals; National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws; National Council on Crime and Delinquency;
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice; National Sheriffs
Association; and the ABA Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Service.
133. Sympathetic prison officials can point to the threat of sanctions to buttress
their requests to legislatures for more money. There should also be considerable
publicity value when, for instance, it is found that more money is spent by the state
on beauty pageants and football stadiums than on prisons. See Drake, Enforcing the
Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 AM. CRuM. L. REV. 587, 607-09 & n.79
(1972).
134. 309 F. Supp. 362.
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lature convened an extraordinary session and appropriated an
additional four million dollars for the correctional system. 135
Similarly, an analogue of the human rights committee in Wyatt 136
could report to the court and evaluate progress. For example, in
Campbell v. McGruder137 the court appointed the District of
Columbia Public Defender as counsel for any inmate who com-
plained about jail conditions. The Public Defender has acted as a
type of ombudsman, working out the problems of individual in-
mates. In combination with the court's requirement that plaintiffs'
expert witnesses have free access to jail, this system has greatly
increased the visibility of the jail's internal workings and has led to
several contempt proceedings against jail personnel for violation
of the court's preliminary injunction and orders. 3 '
Wyatt's threat to take "other measures" shows that courts can
restructure prisons as well as hospitals. For instance, the court
considered ordering the state to sell non-productive land to finance
the reforms. 139 A court simply might appoint overseers to guide
prison operations, much like the master which the Wyatt court
threatened to appoint.' 4 0
Jones v. Wittenberg'4' illustrates how courts can develop and
enforce detailed standards for major prison reform.' 42 The court
found an Ohio jail outstandingly bad from every standpoint, 14 3 and
ordered a hearing to determine remedies for the situation. After
135. 36 Mo. L. REv. 576, 584 (1971).
136. 325 F. Supp. 781, 783; note 125 supra.
137. Civil No. 1462-71 (D.D.C., filed sub nom. Campbell v. Rodgers, July 22,
1971). See generally 1 PRISON L. REP. 60 (1971).
138. E.g., Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973).
In Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 555 (E.D. La. 1972), the court stated
that failure to comply with its orders to change and upgrade prison and prison life
at Orleans Parish Prison might result in the institution of contempt proceedings
against the defendants.
139. 344 F. Supp. at 393.
140. Id. at 392-93.
141. 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
142. For example, in Garrison v. Hickman, Civil No. 2280 (W.D. Mo., filed
June 7, 1972), the court ordered the county to propose regulations for mail privileges,
inmate conduct, and minimum due process in disciplinary proceedings. The court
also required defendants to submit minimum standards for clothing, health care,
hygiene and exercise. Finally, the court enjoined the use of solitary confinement
except for suicidal or otherwise self-destructive prisoners, and imposed specific
procedural requirements for authorization of solitary. See 1 PRISON L. REP. 257,
258 (1972).
143. 323 F. Supp. at 95-99. Among conditions cited by the court were broken down
and unsanitary plumbing, overcrowding, insufficient number of guards, unsanitary
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the hearing five months later, the court laid down specific steps
for the defendants.'"
The court first addressed the problem of financing necessary
improvements. It conceded that the legislature controlled taxation
and that the courts could not order it to raise money, but decided
that it could order the Sheriff to redistribute funds already allocated
to him. The court thus ordered the defendants to transfer funds
currently spent on police services for county areas which already
had local police protection.' 45 The court required the defendants
to formulate specific plans, with estimates of the cost, time, and
personnel required for implementation. These plans were required
to meet the court's detailed specifications in a wide variety of
areas.
Most significantly, the court allowed only thirty days to
develop a scheme for classifying prisoners according to their needs
in many areas, such as crisis intervention, group or individual
counseling, educational or vocational training, employment, and
family needs.' 46 Indeed, the court said that it would not accept a
plan unless it included work or study release programs.147
The court followed the common practice in prison cases of
allowing the defendants to propose their own plans. This technique
obviously reduces the friction between a court and other govern-
mental entities. Indeed, the federal courts have preferred this
method in voting and civil rights cases.148 In light of both practical
politics and theoretical expertise, a court presumably would use
a similar strategy in enforcing a right of rehabilitation.
Another federal court simply had inmates and officials nego-
tiate their differences, and adopted the resulting standards of
conduct in its decree. 149 A similar tactic is to recognize inmate
and nutritionally deficient food, "primitive" health care facilities, and inadequate
visitation rights. The court also found a total absence of "social services, exercise,
recreation, reading, rehabilitation, or any other human resources to meet human
needs." Id. at 97. Discipline was found to be arbitrarily administered and the usual
method of punishment was confinement in something resembling a medieval
dungeon.
144. 330 F. Supp. at 707.
145. Id. at 712-13. The court of appeals later found this to be a legitimate, care-
fully considered way of raising funds. 456 F.2d at 856.
146. 330 F. Supp. at 717.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964).
149. Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
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unions in order to encourage inmates and officials to bargain collec-
tively over working and living conditions. 150
The courts have thus established a number of effective and
precedential tactics for enforcing the rights of the treatment group
and prisoners. By proceeding carefully, calling upon experts, and
placing the burden of planning on prison administrators, the
courts could establish a right to rehabilitation as well. Though
the goal of rehabilitation is admittedly less than precise, it is no
more vague than the concept of adequate treatment in hospital
cases.
C. Enforcement Procedures
1. Contempt
Civil contempt may be of some value as an enforcement tool.
Landman v. Royster151 found prison officials in civil contempt
for failure to implement procedural safeguards in disciplinary
proceedings. The court found a continuing pattern of isolating
prisoners without hearings either before or after confinement,
in violation of a previous order. Giving defendants the benefit
of every doubt, the court did not find that they willfully thwarted
150. So far, inmates in New York, Massachusetts and Delaware have applied for
recognition as unions, and courts have at least allowed them to proceed. See 1 PRISON
L. REP. 252 n.7, 313 (1972).
In one union case, Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the right of prisoners and
attorneys to correspond by mail regarding their efforts to form an inmate union in
Green Haven Prison. The court was receptive to the concept of inmate unions,
saying:
There is nothing in federal or state constitutional or statutory law of which
I am aware that forbids prison inmates from seeking to form, or correctional
officials from electing to deal with, an organization or agency or repre-
sentative group of inmates concerned with prison conditions and inmates'
grievances....
The formation of a prisoners' "union," even in its nonrhetorical sense,
does not strike me as a proposal totally unacceptable to society. Indeed,
unless positive steps are taken by "management"-the correctional
authorities themselves-to meet legitimate grievances, radically to change
a system that is at least one hundred years behind the times, and wholly to
alter what Chief Justice Burger has referred to as the tendency "to regard
all criminals as human rubbish," one may surmise that inmate "unions" or at
least some form of collective inmate representation, are inevitable. Social
progress may be slow in forthcoming, but ... the history of organized labor
in the United States, is not all that inept or far-fetched an analogy.
Id. at 1245-46 (footnotes omitted).
151. 354 F. Supp. 1292.
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its order. It did hold them in civil contempt, however, which
requires only failure to comply, regardless of good faith. Since it
deemed imprisonment unnecessary for future compliance, the
court imposed a $25,000 fine jointly and severally on all defendants.
It suspended the fine, however, on the condition that they take
all necessary steps to implement the order.152
In Campbell v. McGruder'53 the plaintiffs sought criminal
contempt, which would have resulted in imprisonment, but they
could not meet the necessary standard of proof. Criminal con-
tempt will likely be of little use to prisoners since they find
themselves on the defendant's own territory, and are thus at a
great disadvantage in proving the administrators' intent beyond a
doubt. 154
2. Release
Several courts have threatened to release or transfer pris-
oners who were confined under unconstitutional conditions. In
Hamilton v. Love 155 the court said:
If the state cannot obtain the resources to detain persons
awaiting trial in accordance with minimum constitutional
standards, then the state simply will not be permitted
to detain such persons.156
Although Hamilton dealt with pre-trial detainees, its reasoning
should apply to convicts as well.
Indeed, in Hodge v. Dodd157 the court found that a jail vio-
lated the eighth amendment because it was a fire trap, cramped,
and dirty. Since repair costs would have been prohibitive, the
court assumed the administrators would build a new jail and
ordered them to keep no more prisoners in the old jail. While
152. Id. at 1301-02.
153. Civil No. 1462-71 (D.D.C., filed sub nom. Campbell v. Rodgers, July 22,
1971). See also 1 PISON L. REP. 278, 279 (1972).
154. The potential of civil contempt was also shown in Theriault v. Carlson, 353
F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Ga. 1973). There the district court found in civil contempt
the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Bureau's head chaplain, and other
officials, for their interference with inmates' practice of their religion- "The
Church of the New Song." The court, saying it was no excuse that the defendants
were acting on advice of counsel, decided, however, to defer punishment until
the underlying issues in the case had been decided on appeal.
155. 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
156. Id. at 1194. This language was also quoted in Brenneman v. Madigan,
343 F. Supp. 128, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
157. 1 PRISON L. REP. 263, 264 (1972).
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administrators may assume that they can meet threats to close
prisons by finding alternative facilities at some future time, the
language of cases like Hamilton158 indicates that some courts might
release inmates if administrators do not promptly provide im-
proved alternative facilities.
The remedy of habeas corpus and the result of the exclusionary
evidence rule support the legitimacy of outright release. Both
procedures often free convicts who appear to be dangerous.
Nevertheless, the courts release them because enforcement of
constitutional rights is more important than potential danger to
the public. The issue of guilt or innocence is overshadowed by
the state's duty to exercise its power lawfully.' 5 9
Further support for release comes from the chain gang cases.
Johnson v. Dye160 freed a chain gang prisoner who had been bru-
talized. Although the Supreme Court reversed per curiam, 1 61 at
least one case has interpreted the Court's reason to be merely
failure to exhaust state remedies, rather than any fundamental
disagreement with release as a remedy.162
Although courts will doubtless try other enforcement tech-
niques before resorting to release, the remedy is not without
precedent. It finds support in strong dicta in several important
prison and treatment cases. 163
3. Damages
Finally, a number of prisoners have sought damages for their
unconstitutional treatment. 1 64 But such actions do not appear to
158. 328 F. Supp. at 1194. See also Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. at 139.
159.
There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, that under
our constitutional exclusionary doctrine "[tihe criminal is to go free be-
cause the constable has blundered." In some cases this will undoubtedly be
the result. But . . . "there is another consideration- the imperative of
judicial integrity." The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that
sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of its own existence.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (citations and footnotes omitted). See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
160. 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949).
161. 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
162. Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677, 682 n.22 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 828 (1950).
163. E.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d at 458-59; Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp.
at 1194.
164. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Wright v. McMann,
387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
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be a promising method of institutional reform. In suits for com-
pensatory damages, each plaintiff must show actual damages. This
requirement precludes any realistic possibility of a class action.
While plaintiffs need not prove actual damages in order to obtain
punitive damages,' 65 they must demonstrate that officials dis-
played a clear pattern of intentional abuse, or at least a callous
disregard for inmate safety. 166 Since prison conditions are poor
even when administrators are conscientious, it would be exceed-
ingly difficult for plaintiffs to meet so strict a standard. If they
could, however, damage actions would be a highly effective reme-
dy-especially if prison officials were not indemnified. The realistic
possibility of paying large sums out of one's own pocket would
probably have an immediate deterrent effect.
D. Limits of Enforcement
The converse side of a right to rehabilitation is that it might
give convicts all the liabilities and none of the benefits of the treat-
ment group. Convicts should not be burdened with the old treat-
ment rationalization that courts will not scrutinize administrators'
decisions closely since they are trying to "help" the patients. The
courts must apply the due process rights of the treatment group, as
well as all recently recognized prisoner's rights, to prisoners.
Administrators must follow procedural safeguards in decisions
strongly affecting prisoners' rehabilitation interests. ' 67
There is also some danger that prisons will adopt the reha-
bilitation model only on a cosmetic level. This danger is shown all
too clearly in the history of the Patuxent Institution. Despite the
legislature's good intentions and strong financial support,16 8
Patuxent has been criticized repeatedly as a prison with little ef-
fect on recidivism.' 69 Some authorities question the possible
efficacy of any rehabilitation-oriented prison.' 0
165. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1965).
166. See generally Note, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1060, 1071-76 (1971).
167. In Paola v. Cupp, 11 Ore. App. 43, 500 P.2d 739 (1972) prisoners challenged
their termination from a rehabilitation program as violative of their procedural
rights. The court dismissed the action, finding legislative intent to exempt all
actions by the Corrections Division relating to rehabilitation programs, including
termination therefrom, from state procedural safeguards. Id. at 46-47, 500 P.2d
at 740-41.
168. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th Cir. 1971), cites the extra-
ordinary state investment in Patuxent.
169. Prettyman, supra note 94, at 7-12.
170. See Singer, supra note 63.
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A more serious danger, however, is that the correctional
system might become an instrument of a "therapeutic state," in
which prisoners would be made to conform simply so that they
no longer upset society. 171 Without some standard, of human
dignity, rehabilitation will become brainwashing. Rehabilitation
must be the kind defined by Morales-alteration of behavior by
voluntary positive inducement rather than by infliction of sanc-
tions. 172
One method of avoiding the therapeutic state is to subject
rehabilitation programs to the same hard scrutiny as other mea-
sures which limit inmates' freedom. At least one court has taken
this kind of hard look at the related problem of a mental patient's
right to refuse treatment because of religious beliefs. In Winters
v. Miller173 the court applied the compelling interest standard of
the equal protection cases to the state's treatment of a patient
over her religious objections. The court held that the right to
refuse treatment on religious grounds applies to all patients, even
those committed as mentally ill; only a separate finding of incom-
petence can defeat the individual's right to refuse. 174
A broader right might rest upon the right to privacy recog-
nized in Griswold v. Connecticut 75 and Stanley v. Georgia.176
Stanley applied the right to privacy in terms more relevant to the
right to refuse rehabilitation. In upholding the right of citizens to
possess pornography, the Court said that a state may not premise
legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts. 177 Thus, a court could find privacy to be fimdamental for
171. The dangers of the therapeutic state are illustrated by the experimenta-
tion done in California under a "progressive" statute which provided for develop-
ment of treatment for criminals. Among the treatments administered was aversion
therapy, which involved injection of a drug which left the inmate conscious, but
completely paralyzed, each time he misbehaved. Even his ability to breathe was
lost, so that artificial respirators had to be applied. While an inmate was in such a
state, the "therapist" would repeat over and over that he ought not to do whatever
he had done. Clearly this process and other "treatments" like lobotomy and electro-
shock present serious questions of cruel and unusual punishment which must not
be avoided simply because they are styled as "treatment." Note, Conditioning and
Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners
and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616 (1972).
172. See 340 F. Supp. at 552-53.
173. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
174. Id. at 71.
175. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy).
176. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
177. Id. at 566.
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inmates and prohibit unwanted "rehabilitative" intrusions into in-
mates' minds.
The cruel and unusual punishment clause also might bar
drastic "therapeutic" intrusions on inmates' minds and bodies.
Involuntary lobotomy, shock therapy, and aversion therapy may
offend society's sense of human dignity. Moreover, procedural due
process should give an inmate the opportunity to demonstrate
that a particular rehabilitation plan would do him no good. The
prison context presents a problem for any right to refuse, how-
ever, because of the difficulty in determining whether participation
in rehabilitation programs is truly voluntary. If an inmate's only
alternative to participation is idle confinement in inferior quarters
or loss of parole opportunities because of lack of cooperation, then
he is still forced into rehabilitation programs.
One crude safeguard against forced consent would be specific
procedures to insure informed consent before subjecting inmates
to any severe treatment. Wyatt required this consent before pa-
tients could participate in experiments, shock therapy, and other
extreme measures.1" 8
IV. CONCLUSION
This country cannot cure its crime problem solely through
prison reform. Too many other factors contribute to crime; prison
is only the last stop in a criminal justice process which comes into
play only after much damage has been done. But while prison re-
form without social change would change little, social change
would avail little without prison reform.
The possibility of either depends on how people feel about
each other. The right of convicts to rehabilitation hinges on so-
ciety's attitude toward nonconforming members. If we see their
personality differences as an accusation of our own values, we will
retaliate against them. If we separate their truly destructive acts
from those that are merely threatening, however, we can eliminate
simply the behavior rather than the whole person. The "radical"
notion that social deviants are people has taken hold slowly in the
law. It was this notion which allowed the courts in the treatment
cases and Morales to accept the long-standing legal arguments for
patients' and prisoners' rights.
178. 344 F. Supp. at 400-02.
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Convicts need a healthy environment, safe from the threat of
physical harm. They also need a humane atmosphere and mean-
ingful activity which will not hinder their successful reintegration
into society. But there is no consensus on how to reach these
conditions.
One possible way is to have a right to rehabilitation which
simply modifies the present prison format to include healthy as
well as secure physical facilities, and educational, vocational, or
psychological rehabilitation programs. The treatment cases pro-
vide precedent for such a right and indicate its efficacy. The mixed
results of institutions like Patuxent, however, indicate that exten-
sive development in that direction could leave society with an
albatross of concrete and steel.
This situation might be avoided by a rigorous judicial appli-
cation of the least restrictive alternative standard. Convicts would
retain as many civil liberties as possible, and government efforts
might take the flexible form of community-based services rather
than large institutions.
The potential dangers of an openly declared right to reha-
bilitation-i.e., the permanent commitment of massive resources
to unproved rehabilitation techniques and the advent of the thera-
peutic state-makes the Morales equal protection theory a more
rational alternative. It reflects the philosophy that convicts are
citizens and entitled to the same rights as others, except when
public protection absolutely demands otherwise. It does not raise
the issue of limited civil rights, which is still too prevalent in
prison and treatment contexts. Morales would also ensure a hu-
mane environment for convicts, and would put rehabilitation pro-
grams in their proper perspective by allowing convicts to partici-
pate voluntarily in a spectrum of programs substantially similar to
those available to the public. The least drastic alternative test
would prevent the needless development of massive and inflexible
institutions.
Whatever its form, the right to rehabilitation means choosing
action over inaction. Action can bring bad as well as good results.
But so long as the potential good is far better than the status
quo, and the bad is avoidable, society should not let possible
failure determine its actions.
The evidence to date indicates that courts can implement a
right to rehabilitation without creating either extreme chaos or a
therapeutic state. If anything, the treatment and prisoners' rights
cases may have had too little, rather than too great, an impact.
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